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Undoubtedly the interwar era was the period in European history when the sacralization 
of politics reached its apex. Totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union, Italy and Germany 
perfected their forms of political religion to unprecedented heights, while in most Eastern 
European countries authoritarian dictators adopted many aspects of it to cement their 
regimes. In democratic countries in Western Europe, fascist movements, and socialist and 
communist parties also did their best to gain adherents, causing a fierce ideological 
competition. One arena where all existing ideologies clashed in an extremely violent 
manner was Spain during the Civil War (1936-1939). A part of the army had rebelled in 
July 1936 and rapidly succeeded in gaining control over about half the country. The 
rebels could count on the support of the small but determined Spanish fascist movement, 
the Falange, the reactionary Carlists, --who supported a dissident branch of the House of 
Bourbon– and most Catholic conservatives and monarchists. Under General Francisco 
Franco the resulting Civil War was presented as a crusade to reinstate order in Spain. 
During the war, but more so after his final victory in April 1939, Franco blended the 
various ideological movements that supported his regime into one eclectic, national-
Catholic political religion, which was clearly totalitarian in aspiration and which in 
various gradations would be characteristic of his semi-fascist dictatorship, which lasted 
until his death in 1975.1 
The government of the Second Republic received the support of republicans, the 
regionalist movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia, socialists, communists and 
the remarkably strong anarchist movement. Although after the first chaotic phase of the 
Civil War had passed an unstable compromise was reached between these groups to 
postpone most far-reaching social reforms until after the war, the various parties and 
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trade unions within the republican camp tried to increase their following during the 
struggle, while tightening the bonds with their supporters. 
The Civil War became a violent clash between left and right with international 
repercussions. Both camps presented the war as a struggle between good and evil, and 
many international volunteers flocked to Spain to defend their respective causes. The 
communists alone succeeded in recruiting more than 30,000 sympathisers from over 50 
countries for the International Brigades. And the enthusiasm with which ordinary 
Spaniards embraced the cause of one of the participating militias or parties was equally 
overwhelming. However, in order to establish their own land of milk and honey many 
obstacles had to be removed. Thus, with almost religious zeal political opponents were 
killed behind the frontline, creating approximately 50,000 victims in the Republican zone 
and 180,000 in the Francoist sector.2 As a consequence, the Spanish Civil War offers a 
tragic, while intriguing case, not only of the sacralization of politics from above but also 
of the widely felt need to believe from below. 
Within the Republican zone – which will be the focus of this chapter – 
surprisingly the most widespread, and probably the most deeply felt shared political idea, 
seems to have been the belief in unbelief, the anticlerical idea that the Catholic Church 
represented an evil that had to be rooted out. Thus among the radical measures that were 
implemented on a local level during the first few chaotic months after the outbreak of the 
war, such as the collectivization of businesses, the occupation of farm land and the 
formation of revolutionary councils, we find the confiscation of almost all church 
properties. Ecclesiastical buildings were turned into party headquarters, arsenals or horse 
stables, but most were simply put to the torch, which only rarely happened with manors, 
factories or barracks. Moreover, clergymen, more than fascists, monarchists, 
conservatives or capitalists, were the object of fierce attacks by all kind of local militias. 
Whole areas were almost ritually purged of priests, monks and even nuns. This quasi-
religious zeal raises the question whether we should understand the anticlericalism in the 
Republican zone as a political religion that was imposed from below. 
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Anticlerical attitudes in Spain have been explained in religious terms before. Thus, 
Gerald Brenan and Eric Hobsbawm have argued that Spanish anticlericalism had strong 
millenarian undertones. In his classic study of the Spanish Civil War, Brenan even 
explicitly compares the anticlericalism of the Andalusian anarchists with iconoclast 
heretical movements from the Middle Ages or the early Modern Era, such as the 
Waldenses and the Anabaptists, while the noted British historian Hobsbawm emphasizes 
the archaic character of their rebelliousness.3 Other scholars have criticized this focus on 
the supposed irrational and millenarian character of anticlerical violence by reasoning 
that the revolutionaries pursued clear political and even rational goals with their supposed 
primitive means. Although most authors of more recent studies try to be more balanced, 
they still struggle to find a rationale for this collective outburst of violence.4 Analysing 
Spanish anticlericalism in terms of the sacralization of politics could provide an 
interesting new approach because it sidesteps the dichotomy of rational versus irrational 
or secular versus religious. 
In order to analyse to what extent Spanish anticlericalism can be fruitfully studied 
as a political religion, we first have to comprehend the origins of this hostility towards the 
Catholic Church. This chapter will therefore start with a short overview of the 
development of the transnational conflict between clericalism and anticlericalism since 
the French Revolution. Then it will address the question why this conflict became so 
prominent and fierce in Spain. In the last section the outburst of anticlerical violence in 
the Republican zone will be the object of analysis. 
 
Anticlericalism in Europe, 1789-1905 
Modern anticlericalism is primarily the product of the Enlightenment and was therefore 
not a specifically Spanish phenomenon. Eighteenth-century philosophers such as Voltaire 
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heavily criticized the Catholic Church for its pompous ceremonies, the superstitious 
worship of saints, the low intellectual level of the clergy and the lack of productivity of 
the monastic orders. Although some enlightened monarchs initiated reforms, the conflict 
between Church and state would reach a first climax during the French Revolution. On 4 
August 1789 the privileges of the Church were nullified by the National Assembly. 
Shortly afterwards the properties of the Church were ‘nationalised’. Since the tithe was 
also abolished, the Church then had virtually no income, and it was decided that the 
secular clergy would be paid by the government.5 
The Revolution thus effectively stripped the Catholic Church of its privileges and 
most of its possessions. This happened not only in France but also in most of the 
territories occupied by the French Republic or the subsequent Napoleonic regime. These 
measures, and particularly the radical anticlerical policy during Robespierre’s reign of 
terror, would continue to frighten many Catholics during the remainder of the 19th 
century. The Church subsequently fiercely opposed all ideas and currents that smacked of 
Jacobinism and sought cooperation with groups that had also lost their privileges during 
the Revolution, such as the nobility and the monarchs. The Restoration Era thus 
witnessed a renewed alliance between throne and altar. Moreover, because the Church 
more than ever needed donations and bequests, it came to depend more heavily than 
before on the rich. 
As a consequence, in most Catholic countries anticlericalism was clearly on the 
rise among more progressive groups. Their criticism was directed at the Church, the 
clergy and sometimes even religion itself, and during the 19th century such criticism was 
generally of a rational and enlightened nature. The underlying argument was that religion 
belonged to the private sphere and that the Church should play no role in the political 
debate or public space. The power of the state should prevail and the freedom of 
conscience of every individual should be respected. In practice, the resulting conflict was 
often fought out over the control of education. Other areas of conflict included marriages 
and funerals. In Catholic countries cemeteries generally were administered by the Church 
or contained a Catholic section. This situation could result in unpleasant conflicts, as the 
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priest could refuse to bury someone – for immoral behaviour – in the Catholic cemetery, 
even if the family possessed a family tomb there. 
Some anticlericals were not satisfied with the removal of the Church from the 
public domain and also fiercely criticized the clergy. Priests, friars and nuns were often 
accused of being unproductive and of not living according to the teachings of the Church. 
They were seen as vain, vindictive, sneaky, fanatical and cruel. Moreover, many did not 
keep the vow of chastity, which was seen as problematic, particularly for male members 
of the clergy, as this could lead to sexual intercourse with married and unmarried women, 
orgies with nuns, unnatural sex and paedophilia. In books, magazines, songs, caricatures 
and stories such activities were frequently and graphically depicted. Priests were also 
portrayed as parasites, criminals, perverts and even as infectious diseases. The authors of 
these tracts did not merely condemn individual behaviour but above all chided the malign 
influence exerted by the clergy. This criticism could also induce individuals or groups to 
attack the clergy or to disrupt public expressions of religiosity, such as processions.6 
A third form of anticlericalism was directed at religion itself. We find examples in 
satirical writings and parodies but also in word and gesture. Many Catholic dogmas, such 
as the Trinity and the virgin birth were ridiculed as absurd, primitive and unscientific. 
Collecting bones and old rags as relics was denounced as unhygienic and more suitable 
for primitive tribes. A Frenchman jokingly claimed to have found a tear of Judas in a 
Swiss glacier. As long as a large part of the people continued to believe in such nonsense, 
progress based on reason would be impossible, it was argued. Catholic holidays were also 
desecrated. In 1868, the French literary critic Sainte-Beuve organized a banquet on the 
occasion of Good Friday. This was a day that Catholics had to refrain from eating meat. 
So at the banquet there was meat in abundance. For a variety of associations of 
freethinkers this would even become an annual tradition. Eating lamb at such an occasion 
was especially popular, as it was a symbol of Christ.7 
During the second half of the 19th century, progressive politicians in most Western 
European countries succeeded in restricting the influence of the Catholic Church on the 
public sphere, Spain being the main exception. Developments in Italy, where the relations 
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between the Church and the state began to worsen as a consequence of the wars of Italian 
unification, would have a particularly strong impact. When in 1848 many Italians called 
for a war to liberate Lombardy and Venice from Austrian occupation, Pius IX refused to 
rally the Papal State. As a consequence the Pope was briefly driven out of Rome by a 
popular uprising. When between 1859 and 1861 a new unified Italian kingdom was 
created, Pius lost most of the Papal State, while in 1870 even Rome was conquered by the 
army of King Victor Emmanuel II. He offered the Pope control over the Vatican and the 
corresponding part of Rome, but Pius IX turned it down and even refused to recognize 
the new Italian state or to set foot outside the Vatican.8 
Responsibility for the deteriorating relationship between the Church and the new 
authorities could not be fully attributed to the Italian state. After his flight from Rome in 
1848, Pius IX repudiated his earlier sympathies for liberalism and began a 
counteroffensive. In 1854 he declared the popular belief in the Immaculate Conception of 
Mary an official dogma, while in 1864 he published the Encyclical Quanta Cura which 
rejected various liberal principles, such as religious toleration, freedom of speech and the 
separation of Church and state. As an appendix he included the Syllabus Errorum 
wherein he condemned rationalism, liberalism, socialism, nationalism and secularism. On 
top of this Pius summoned the first Vatican Council in 1869, which proclaimed Papal 
infallibility in matters of faith, while he also forbade Catholics to actively participate in 
the national politics of the new Italian state.9 
Italy, however, was not the only state that collided head-on with the Catholic 
Church; conflicts also occurred in the newly unified German Empire, where Bismarck 
launched his Kulturkampf and in the French Third Republic. In both countries the 
government limited the political influence of the Church, prohibited a number of 
monastic orders and particularly curtailed the role of the Church in primary and 
secondary education. In France, cemeteries were also secularized and crucifixes were 
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removed from schools, hospitals, courts and other public buildings, while processions in 
the open air were forbidden.10 
Pope Leo XIII, who took office in 1878, modified the politics of the Vatican. 
Instead of confrontation, he sought cooperation with the key European states. So in 1892, 
he urged French Catholics to accept the republic and to give up their fight for the 
restoration of the monarchy. Even more influential was his Encyclical Rerum Novarum 
from 1891. In it Leo XIII showed his concern over the fate of the working classes. He 
called on Catholics to form their own trade unions and other organizations to address the 
interests of Catholics in general and the workers in particular. This meant in fact that the 
Pope was no longer looking back nostalgically to the privileged position of the Church 
under the Ancient Regime but was confronting the modern political realities in Europe, 
while urging Catholics to accept the rules of the parliamentary system and try to use them 
for their own benefit. 
The Church also attempted to defend its position and influence by increasing its 
visibility. Thus, pilgrimages to Rome and new pilgrimage sites such as Lourdes were 
strongly encouraged by the Church. Moreover, new, conspicuous churches were built, 
such as the Sacré-Coeur in Paris, which was meant as atonement for the sins committed 
during the Commune of 1871. The Jesuits, in particular, promoted the veneration of the 
Sacred Heart of Jesus, which symbolized God’s love for mankind, and Catholics were 
encouraged to hang a small medallion of the Sacred Heart at the entrance of their house. 
This new sacralization or Catholization of the public sphere and the simultaneous 
advance of Catholic organizations, trade unions and political parties caused discontent in 
the progressive, anticlerical camp. In France matters came to a hard confrontation when 
in 1901 a left-wing government determined that all monastic orders should receive 
official recognition. The subsequent government refused this recognition based on the 
argument that the orders were subordinate to a foreign power: the Vatican. It therefore 
closed down 12,000 Catholic private schools, and 50,000 monks and nuns left the country. 
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In 1905 a law that radically separated Church and state was introduced, and as a result the 
government stopped paying the salaries of the secular clergy.11 
Since in Italy, Germany and France the state thus succeeded in diminishing the 
public role and influence of the Church as an institution, the urgency to combat 
clericalism in all its aspects slowly diminished. However, this was not the case in Spain. 
Here, the state failed to diminish the public role of the Church, and as a consequence 
anticlericals stepped up their efforts. 
 
Anticlericalism in Spain, 1833-1931 
In Spain relations between the state and the Church were not free from frictions during 
most of the 19th century. Because the Napoleonic occupation of Spain – which began in 
1808 – never succeeded in pacifying the entire country, the first major wave of 
secularization of church properties would begin only in the 1830s. When King Ferdinand 
VII died in 1833 he was succeeded by his infant daughter Isabel II. This succession was, 
however, contested by Ferdinand’s younger and extremely reactionary brother Carlos, 
who received support from those parts of the country, especially Navarre, the Basque 
Country and Catalonia, where the abolition of feudal rights and privileges during the 
French occupation had been widely resented. In order to gain the support of her subjects 
the queen mother had no option but to introduce liberal reforms, while embarking upon a 
massive scheme of ecclesiastical confiscations in order to finance the war against the 
Carlists. Many members of the clergy consequently sided with Don Carlos, and the 
Church excommunicated those who participated in the confiscations or who bought 
former church lands.12 
The relations between the state and the Church settled down only with the 
Concordat of 1851. The Pope recognized the expropriations, while the state agreed to pay 
the secular clergy. Moreover, it was recognized that the Catholic religion was, to 
exclusion of all other faiths, the religion of the Spanish nation and that all education 
should conform to its doctrines.13 This new-found balance between a moderate-liberal 
constitutional monarchy and the Church was shattered with the fall of Isabel II in 1868. A 
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military coup forced her into exile, and the new regime introduced a more progressive 
constitution in which for the first time freedom of religion was recognized. The new 
regime even began to anticipate many anticlerical reforms which in the following decades 
would actually be introduced in the German Empire and France. However, after the 
short-lived republican experiment ended in total chaos, a new military coup restored the 
monarchy, thus bringing the so-called Sexenio Democrático to an end. 
Under the restored Bourbon king, Alfonso XII, a new constitution was to provide 
broad support for the parliamentary regime of the Restoration (1875-1931). A 
compromise was found for the religious question, proclaiming that Roman Catholicism 
would be the religion of the state, while permitting the private practice of other faiths. 
Although the re-established dominance of the Church in educational matters was fiercely 
contested by the left, both Pope Pius IX and the Spanish bishops refused to accept this 
toleration of other religions, which they regarded as a recognition of error and heresy. 
Nonetheless, under Leo XIII the Vatican took a more moderate stance, urging the 
Spanish Catholics to accept the political system of the Restoration and even to participate 
actively in political and social matters.14 
In general, the Catholic Church prospered under the Restoration regime. There 
was no separate Catholic political party as in Germany, but the Conservative Party in 
particular defended the interests of the Church. Moreover, the state lacked the money to 
counteract the growing importance of Catholic schools for primary and secondary 
education, even when moderately anticlerical liberals formed the government. The clergy 
even taught religion classes at state schools. Moreover, the number of secular clergy, 
largely dedicated to education, trebled between 1887 and 1900, rising to about 44,000 
nuns and 13,000 monks.  
The Church also kept a dominant role in the field of private ceremonies, such as 
weddings and burials, and in many cases received support from the state to impose a 
virtual monopoly. In 1903, for instance, the Guardia Civil arrested the pall-bearers of a 
girl who on the expressed wish of her father received a civil burial in the Basque village 
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of Gallarta.15 Unlike what happened in Italy, Germany and France, the public role of the 
Church therefore increased after the attempts to curb its influence during the Sexenio 
ended in failure. Furthermore, as the Church now lacked independent sources of income, 
it became increasingly dependent on wealthy patrons in order to fund its many charitable 
and educational establishments, while at the same time it failed to develop effective 
measures to relieve the miserable conditions of the industrial and agricultural working 
classes.16 
 
In this context a new enlightened anticlericalism prospered and at times of crises could 
combine with a more popular anticlerical attitude that had much older roots and can be 
associated with the archaic forms of social protest studied by Hobsbawm. In the Middle 
Ages dissatisfaction with the Church and the behaviour of the clergy was already 
widespread. Since the Church claimed to have access to higher powers and that God 
could bring prosperity, it was also held accountable in times of misfortune or natural 
disasters, which sometimes led to explosions of violence. Originally, these were 
spontaneous riots, rather than politically motivated revolts, but from the French 
Revolution onwards anticlericalism would become ever more politically charged, as the 
Church began to reject all kinds of political innovations, such as parliaments, 
constitutions, religious tolerance, elections and secular education, while it openly 
supported reactionary monarchs. 
A first outburst of anticlerical violence in the modern era took place in 1834.  
Traditional elements, such as the belief in the supernatural powers of the clergy that 
could also be applied for evil purposes, were mixed with more modern political elements. 
The fight against the Carlist uprising that had received the support of many priests 
obliged the government to call upon new recruits and raise taxes, both rather unpopular 
measures. When on top of this a cholera epidemic broke out in Madrid, the situation in 
the Spanish capital became critical. Rumours that the Jesuits had deliberately poisoned 
the city’s drinking water led to widespread riots. A mob that apparently held the Jesuits 
responsible both for making common cause with the enemy and for bringing disaster to 
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the city first attacked their convent and lynched those friars that could not escape. Within 
a few hours other monasteries were sacked as well and their inhabitants killed, ending the 
day with 78 casualties.17 
Later in the century, especially in politically unstable times, anticlerical outbursts 
continued to occur, but most were minor incidents without fatalities. At the same time, a 
more intellectual, upper- and middle-class anticlericalism developed, which found 
expression in plays, novels, newspaper articles and caricatures. Anticlericalism, moreover, 
became the common denominator of the moderate and radical left, and anticlerical 
remarks could be found in most progressive periodicals. There were even a few 
specialized journals, whose pages were filled with stories about lascivious priests, greedy 
monks, lazy nuns and hypocritical Catholics. There were also a few attempts to found 
private secular schools, while in freethinking societies, republican clubs and freemason 
lodges inflammatory speeches were given, and, in imitation of Sainte-Beuve, festive 
banquets were organized on Good Friday.18  
Nevertheless, the rival positions only radicalized around 1900. This was primarily 
caused by the fact that both Catholics and progressive groups were increasingly trying to 
mobilize a mass audience while sacralizing their cause. Politics was no longer a matter of 
closed meetings and preaching to the converted but moved to the streets. Mass 
manifestations were partly a response to large-scale and well-organized processions and 
pilgrimages.19 Two specific developments caused further growth in anticlericalism. In 
1898 Spain lost its last major colonies of Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines after a 
short but disastrous war against the United States. This outcome was at least partly the 
result of the discontent of the population of these colonies, and as the Church had played 
a major role in converting, educating and controlling the population, especially in the 
Philippines, it was seen as one of the culprits for the military defeat. Moreover, 
progressive Spaniards argued that a drastic modernization of the country was needed in 
order to escape being overrun and maybe even occupied by one of the Great Powers, and 
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therefore the influence of the Church should finally be curtailed. The separation of state 
and church in France functioned as another stimulus for the Spanish left. As a 
consequence of its new anticlerical laws many French clerics had moved to Spain where 
they hoped to realize their dream of a totally Catholic society, in which the state protected 
the Church. This influx of large numbers of clerics only served to underline the need for a 
fresh anticlerical counter-offensive.20 
This counter-offensive found its first expression when the celebration of the 
Jubilee of Christ the Redeemer in 1901 was met with the anticlerical Jubilee of Liberty, 
which commemorated the confiscation of most Church properties by the state 65 years 
earlier. Various other opportunities were seized for public manifestations during which 
anticlerical songs were sung. Sometimes these demonstrations turned into riots in which 
the windows of churches, convents, Catholic schools and seminaries were smashed. 
Anticlericals also tried to disrupt processions by whistling or yelling, sometimes even 
resorting to beating up participants with clubs. At other occasions doors were blocked to 
prevent processions leaving church. In a few cases these actions led to injuries and deaths 
since the Catholics did not respond passively and sometimes even brought guns to defend 
themselves. Civil marriages and funerals were also opportunities for anticlericals to 
express themselves publicly. Increasingly mimicking religious forms, they invented civil 
ceremonies for the baptism of a child, which sometimes included a parade, preceded by 
an orchestra, to the Registry Office. Preferably, this took place on a day when there was a 
Catholic procession that could be disrupted. Children were given names that referred to 
progressive ideals instead of to biblical personages or saints, like Paz, Libertad, Aurora, 
Progreso or Emancipación. Good Friday dinners were opened to the poor, and in some 
cities during Holy Week an Anticlerical Week was organized, with all kinds of 
festivities.21 
 
A new populist anticlericalism 
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In this way an enlightened, intellectual anticlericalism became increasingly connected 
with its traditional, more popular counterpart. Around the turn of the century, it was 
primarily radical republican populist politicians who deliberately tried to link the two 
movements by sacralizing both their rhetoric and political forms, thus transforming 
anticlericalism into a broad, progressive mass movement. The best-known and most 
successful exponent of this new anticlerical populism was Alejandro Lerroux (1864-
1949), who succeeded in mobilizing the lower social classes in Barcelona and winning 
some resounding victories in local elections with a populist, vaguely socialist and 
strongly anticlerical republican programme. Therefore, as shown by the foremost Spanish 
historian José Álvarez Junco, Lerroux created a Manichaean contrast between a basically 
good and morally elevated people and a thoroughly corrupt clergy. The Church thus acted 
as his scapegoat.22 Apparently a rational plea to remove the Church from the public 
sphere was not enough anymore, and he resorted to fiercely criticizing the immoral 
behaviour of the clergy and the detrimental effects of Catholic religious teachings, while 
converting his own ideals into political absolutes. 
The vilifying of the clergy happened in different ways. Among Lerroux’ favourite 
targets were the values promoted by the Church. According to him, clerics were work-
shy parasites, who wanted to keep the people ignorant. Their activities had ensured that 
Spaniards had become a lazy and impotent population of beggars and vagrants addicted 
to the poor relief of the Church. The clerics preached obedience and a slave morality and 
in this way had converted the Spaniards into a submissive people who could be easily 
controlled by the government. Progress, rationality, modernity and a functioning 
democracy in which the people had the power were not possible, according to Lerroux, as 
long as the Church maintained its leading position.23 
Another favoured issue was the unnatural attitude of the clergy towards sexuality. 
The male clerics who dressed as women were expected to abstain from any sexual 
activity. Opponents argued that this abstention was a denial of human nature and could 
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lead to only deviant or unnatural behaviour. Many stories and jokes circulated about 
priests who lived in concubinage with their housekeeper, confessors who lustfully 
touched penitents, and chaplains who eagerly took advantage of their free access to 
convents where they enjoyed all sorts of excesses with nuns and novices. Moreover, 
priests had intimate interviews with married and unmarried women out of sight of their 
husbands, fathers and brothers, and they managed almost certainly to get all kinds of 
sexual favours, which were sometimes even withheld from the spouses. Lerroux and 
other anticlerical politicians took advantage of these stereotypes by often making explicit 
or implicit references to them. 
A major point of criticism – which was also used against other typical scapegoats 
such as Jews, ethnic minorities and freemasons – was the mysterious character of the 
clergy. Everything was done in secret, in the confessional or behind the walls of an 
enclosed monastery. The Jesuits, in particular, were accused of operating clandestinely. 
They formed an uncontrolled but extremely powerful and wealthy sect that exerted an 
enormous influence behind the scenes, especially in the highest circles of society. The 
Church was thus like a spider or an octopus that stretched its tentacles everywhere. 
Lerroux also metaphorically compared the Church to an infectious disease that had fatally 
weakened the people and had to be eradicated. 
In this diatribe against the clergy and religion Lerroux often resorted to religious 
imagery. Science was a magic potion that the people needed to defeat the dragon (Church) 
that lived in the cave of darkness or to exorcise the devil. The nation was compared to 
Christ; she was an innocent lamb sacrificed to save mankind. But one day the people 
would be resurrected and win the final battle against evil. The people were like Moses, 
who guided the nation through the Red Sea and the desert and led her to the Promised 
Land. In the form that Lerroux gave to his political activities religious elements can also 
be identified, which it can be argued conferred upon his ideology many of the 
characteristics of a political religion (including using violence against political 
opponents). It is obvious that this was largely done to attract a poorly educated and often 
even illiterate audience. Therefore, the sacralization of politics seems to be inextricably 
linked with the emergence of mass politics around 1900. 
Lerroux regularly organized mass meetings, which were not meant only to 
highlight the party ideology, to rationally discuss points of view and proceed with votes 
on certain issues or candidates. He wanted, above all, to strengthen the unity among his 
following by appealing more to the heart than to the mind. He positioned himself as a 
kind of messiah, who was persecuted and misunderstood but who eventually would bring 
salvation. Supporters killed by police violence were proclaimed martyrs and venerated as 
secular saints. These martyrs had served as good examples, sacrificing their lives for the 
republican cause, and this act also charged those left behind with a huge responsibility 
because these sacrifices could not remain without consequences. Carrying flags and 
banners and the communal singing of hymns strengthened the feeling of community and 
made these meetings into surrogate church services, where one went to fortify the soul. 
Lerroux also came up with an alternative to the popular local pilgrimages in the form of 
‘democratic picnics’. His followers and their families marched to a hill outside Barcelona 
to eat and drink together, sing revolutionary songs and listen to uplifting speeches. The 
message was clear in all this: salvation came not from Christ or the Church but only from 
the revolution.24 
That revolution seemed to arrive in 1909. This was the consequence of a Spanish 
defeat in Morocco after which a large number of reservists were forced to re-enlist in the 
army. They consisted mostly of married workers who now gathered in Barcelona to be 
transported to Morocco on ships owned by the marquis of Comillas, an arch-conservative 
Catholic. Patriotic ladies from the wealthy classes distributed medallions of the Sacred 
Heart to the recruits. Most of them, however, radically opposed the war, and many threw 
the religious objects into the harbour. On 26 July a general strike was proclaimed to 
protest this imperialistic war. Riots broke out, the force of which initially was directed 
against the state as embodied by tax offices, busses and police stations. On the first 
evening a Catholic school went up in flames, and during the following days 80 
monasteries, churches and seminaries followed, destroying half of all Church buildings in 
Barcelona.25 
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The insurgents submerged the city in chaos, while trying to drive the Catholic 
Church from it. Desecrating churches and monasteries and burning them down was to 
produce – as had been preached by Lerroux – a catharsis. The rioters also went looking 
for evidence of clerical debauchery. Thus, tombs in convents were opened to see if there 
were foetuses or dead bodies of babies – of nuns who had become pregnant – and cells 
were examined for perfumes, pornographic attributes and titillating lingerie.26 Apparently, 
the mob was hoping that demolishing the church buildings and providing the clergy with 
a heavy-handed lesson would be sufficient since only three priests lost their lives during 
this so-called ‘Tragic Week’. 
After a week the army restored order with an iron fist. The eruption of popular 
violence during Tragic Week probably frightened off the more well-to-do anticlericals. 
Even Lerroux, who for a short time fled the country, moderated his anticlerical rhetoric 
after he resumed his political career in Madrid. And after a social-liberal government, led 
by José Canalejas, failed to curtail the influence of the Church, the struggle between 
Catholics and anticlericals lost its intensity. However, the Church in response tried to 
increase its presence in the public realm. 27  This Catholic counter-offensive had 
considerable success after World War I, especially after the atrocities of the Russian 
Revolution became clear to the Spanish upper classes. 
This became particularly evident when in 1919, at the geographical centre of 
Spain, on a hill just south of Madrid, a megalomaniac monument of the Sacred Heart of 
Jesus was unveiled. On this occasion King Alfonso XIII – who until 1914 had given his 
support to a social-liberal modernisation programme – officially dedicated Spain to the 
Sacred Heart. This gesture once more confirmed that for a growing segment of the 
political establishment Spain continued to be a Catholic state. The Church would even 
increase its influence during the military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, which began in 
1923. Although the socialist trade unions would prosper in the new corporatist state, for 
many supporters of the left the military, the wealthy employers and the Church all 
seemed to collaborate to exclude them from political influence. A Jesuit who by that time 
worked in a poor suburb of Madrid recognized that for a labourer society was divided 
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into two: ‘rich and religious bourgeois on the one hand, and poor and irreligious workers 
on the other’.28  
 
Second Republic and Civil War (1931-1939) 
Only after the King and the dictatorship gave way to the Second Republic in 1931, did 
the government manage to introduce laws that effectively separated Church and state. In 
the new constitution freedom of religion was guaranteed and civil marriage and divorce 
were introduced. Other measures included the removal of the influence of the Church on 
public schools, expelling the Jesuits from the country and the proscription of religious 
manifestations in the open air. Thus about 60 years after Italy, Germany and France, 
Spain finally succeeded in restricting the influence and presence of the Church in the 
public realm. However, with the regime change, anticlerical feelings also resurfaced. In 
May 1931, even before the new constitution was adopted, anti-monarchic riots in Madrid 
escalated into an attack on churches and monasteries. The wave of anticlerical violence 
moved to the east and south and reached a climax in Málaga, where all monasteries and 
churches were set ablaze. A few months later the celebration of our Lady of Victory, 
commemorating the expulsion of the Moors from Málaga in 1497, was replaced by a 
parade of local beauties and the election of a Miss Republic.29 The new legal provisions 
were also abused by many left-wing municipalities to show their power over the church. 
A priest was, for instance, fined for saying mass outside after lightning had destroyed the 
roof of his church, while another was penalized for monarchist propaganda when 
churchgoers sang hymns that spoke of the Kingdom of God.30 
Right-wing parties won the elections of 1933, in which for the first time women 
were allowed to vote. The new conservative government decided to freeze both the 
measures against the Church and land reform, thus confirming the close relationship 
between the political right and the clergy. The turn to the right was best visible in the 
return of the Catholic Church to the public realm as processions reappeared on the streets. 
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As a consequence anticlerical eruptions became more violent. Thus during the 
revolutionary strike in Asturias in 1934 about 60 church buildings were destroyed and 34 
clergymen were killed.31 
However, the real explosion of political violence began only after a group of 
right-wing army officers, including Franco, staged a military coup on 17 July 1936 
against the left-wing Popular Front Government that had won the elections a few months 
earlier. In the following days weapons were handed out to those who supported the 
legitimate government or were confiscated by workers’ and party militias. Thanks to the 
loyalty to the Republic of part of the armed forces and the enthusiastic support of a 
considerable section of the population, the military rebels did not succeed in 
overthrowing the government altogether initially, but they did take control of most of the 
western and southern half of the country. In the Republican zone, which contained the 
major towns like Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Bilbao, the authority of the central 
government nevertheless largely collapsed, and power fell into the hands of local 
revolutionary committees and workers’ militias. It took the government about six months 
to restore order and to create a centralized military command in the area they controlled. 
This first turbulent period, in particular, would witness an unprecedented outburst of 
anticlerical violence. 
Although the strict separation between Church and state had by then already been 
introduced five years before, republicans were apparently still not entirely reassured that 
legal regulations would be sufficient. Their distrust was fuelled by the fact that the vast 
majority of the clergy, just like the rest of Spanish conservatives, sympathized with the 
military rebellion or even openly supported it. Although there was no central 
coordination, sentiments in almost the entire Republican zone – the main exception being 
the thoroughly Catholic Basque Country that had remained faithful to the government 
because it was granted regional autonomy – turned against the clergy and often even 
against the Catholic faith. Actually, the anticlericalism of the Republic was mirrored by 
the clericalism of the Nationalist camp. Thus, from about October 1936, Franco’s 
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uprising to save ‘Spain from Marxism at all costs’32 was baptized a national crusade and 
received the open support of the overwhelming majority of Spanish bishops and cardinals. 
The defence of religion became a common denominator for the nationalist camp, even for 
some rather secular or freethinking generals and Falangists.33 
However, it was not so much the measures against the Church but the almost 
religious ardour with which the clergy was persecuted and killed and the ritual forms that 
were used that linked the anticlerical fury with the sacralization of politics. Virtually 
everywhere in the Republican zone priests, monks and even nuns were arrested, 
imprisoned and in many cases murdered. During the Civil War a total of 6832 members 
of the Catholic clergy were killed, most of them in the first six months, including 13 
bishops, 4172 priests, 2364 monks and friars and 283 nuns. 34  In many areas this 
constituted around 40 per cent of the clergy, while the rest, of which the great majority 
generally consisted of nuns, were left unharmed, fled or went into hiding. Among the 
victims of political repression in the Republic the clergy formed the most important 
professional group representing around 20 per cent of the total. The actual political 
sympathies or reputation of individual clergymen – some of whom supported Catalan 
regionalism or had shown a positive attitude towards working-class demands – did not 
matter in most cases; they were murdered because they belonged to the clergy. Young 
novices were in some cases released as they could possibly better their lives, but this was 
never the case with older priests. There might be a kind of court hearing, but in most 
cases the priests and monks were simply shot, and occasionally hanged, drowned, burned, 
or even buried alive. Many were picked up from prison and ‘taken for a ride’, as it was 
called euphemistically, and then executed in a remote area. In many cases they were first 
humiliated and tortured. For example, they had to curse or to undress and sometimes they 
were castrated or forced to run as bulls to a red rag, after which they were killed like a 
beast.35 It seemed a revolutionary duty to exterminate the clergy. In some areas groups of 
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revolutionaries went around villages to verify that the priest had been murdered. Many 
villagers explained later that they had killed the priest because ‘what else could we have 
done to carry out the revolution’. Or ‘what does revolution mean? Had we not agreed to 
kill them all?’36 A militia member exclaimed that a priest was detained ‘because you [the 
clerics] are to blame for everything that is happening’.37 
The destruction of Catholic buildings and symbols was often the most obvious 
sign that a new era had begun. The only buildings that in many regions were destroyed or 
set on fire were churches and monasteries. Sometimes the population limited itself to 
removing the statues of saints and other religious paraphernalia and giving the church 
buildings a new function as garage, storage room, hospital, dance hall, barracks or party 
headquarters. More often, however, it was believed that a real purification could take 
place only through fire. Desecrating liturgical objects also belonged to the often 
spontaneously invented rituals. Members of militias trampled on hosts and put on 
chasubles and other religious garments to celebrate mock masses or processions. The 
Spanish historian Julio de la Cueva seems to agree with Brenan and Hobsbawm when he 
refers to the almost millenarian aspects of the anticlerical violence. He concludes that the 
aggressive behaviour towards sacred images and devotional objects seemed to ‘reveal a 
basic, almost magical belief in their might and the necessity to escape from their 
influence at any cost’. In the Andalusian village of Lepe, for instance, the inhabitants 
attacked the formerly adored patroness saint of the village with an unprecedented ferocity, 
pulling out her eyes, stripping her from clothes and jewels, shooting her, chopping her to 
pieces and throwing the remains into the river.38 
The prominent American historian of religion Bruce Lincoln proposes a slightly 
different and more utilitarian interpretation of these anticlerical atrocities. According to 
him, they should be seen as acts of iconoclasm, as ‘the deliberate and public shattering of 
sacred symbols with the implicit intent of dissolving all loyalty to the institution which 
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employs those symbols, and, further, of dissipating all respect for the ideology which that 
institution propagates’. In this he seems to emphasize the atheistic convictions of those 
who perpetrated these acts, but even for the most radical anticlericals these actions 
probably also contained an element of breaking the spell that the Catholic religion had 
cast over the population at large and maybe even over themselves. Lincoln actually gives 
various examples in which the long-buried corpses of priests, monks and nuns were 
exhumed and publicly displayed, sometimes for several days. As these bodies were 
decomposed, it became manifest that even the members of the clergy were subject to 
death and decay. Many people who went to see the ‘spectacle’ laughed and jeered at them, 
as if they experienced ‘joy or liberation at the degradation of the mighty’. In this way the 
anticlericals tried to demonstrate ‘the powerlessness of the icon’.39 
Lincoln also acknowledges that these humiliating displays of corpses and other 
iconoclastic acts had a strong millenarian flavour. By fiercely rejecting the old rules the 
revolutionaries attempted to ‘create a new morality’. And he concludes:  
 
But prior to the attempt at establishing the ‘new rules’, there was an ominous, 
violent and profoundly shocking phase of ‘no rules’ in the summer of 1936, 
during which political enemies were ruthlessly murdered, churches burned, and 
disinterred corpses were placed on public display. In part, these may have been 
practical steps aimed at demolishing what was left of the ancien régime, but they 
were also the spontaneous dramatization of absolute liberation from all bonds of 
the past, even from those of common decency.40 
 
Illustrative of the anticlerical attitude in the Republican zone was the highly symbolic 
‘execution’ on 7 August 1936 of the monument of the Sacred Heart, that 18 years earlier 
had been inaugurated by King Alfonso XIII with so much pomp. After the fusillade the 
monument was blown up. Fighting the enemy on the battlefront apparently only made 
sense if first the republican part of Spain was liberated from the Catholic yoke under 
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which the country had suffered for so long, and for this task some bullets and explosives 
could certainly be expended. 
De la Cueva describes other symbolic acts perpetrated in the first months of the 
Civil War. Thus, crucifixes and statues of saints along public roads were destroyed. In a 
graveyard in Aragon a man even tried to remove all religious references from the tombs 
with a chisel. The common adiós as a farewell salute was abolished. Cursing came into 
fashion and became a way to make clear that one was on the correct side. In some 
companies blaspheming contests were held. The author also makes clear that this 
purification was not limited to the public sphere but invaded the private sphere as well. In 
many villages a large-scale collection of private religious objects was held, including 
images of saints, devotional pictures, dolls of the child Jesus and medallions of the 
Sacred Heart. These were lumped together and set on fire.41 
 
These events might provide a better understanding of the anticlerical fury of this period. 
One could argue that the clergy and the Church made easy targets. Rich landowners, 
right-wing politicians and large employers knew that they could become a victim of the 
workers’ militia and immediately took measures to escape or to defend themselves, but 
this was much less the case with the Church and its servants. But by attacking clergymen 
left-wing militants did not so much target the Church’s political but its moral and 
symbolic power. And this ‘soft power’ was more pervasive and therefore more dangerous 
than the hard power of the military insurgents, right-wing politicians and their supporters. 
The latter could conquer only the public space, whereas the Church entered the homes 
and private lives of the great majority of the population. The totalitarian ambitions of the 
anticlerical firebrands also aimed to reach into the private sphere and therefore primarily 
targeted the clergy. They probably did not so much fear the influence of the Church on 
themselves, but they wanted to protect their children and wives from it. The anticlerical 
fury thus had a clear gendered aspect as well. Those opponents who could most easily 
penetrate the female sphere – the priests and confessors – should thus be physically 
eliminated, while the religious objects should be radically purged from each home. This 
in a way is confirmed by an old lady from Barcelona who did not want her image of the 
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Virgin Mary to be removed and hoped to protect it (and herself) by attaching an ensign of 
the Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI) to it, exclaiming ‘this is the virgin of the FAI! 
This is one of ours!’42  Although the lady vainly hoped that a compromise was still 
possible, she clearly understood that the main issue was the spiritual domination of her 
own living space and in the end her mind and her heart. In this sense the almost 
totalitarian anticlericalism that expressed itself in the Republican zone seems to be a 
political religion that was imposed from below. 
However, there are a few aspects that call into question this conclusion. First, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at the specific anticlerical character of the rear-guard 
repression. A substantial number of the executions of clerics were in retribution for 
murderous actions, particularly against civilians, by Franco’s troops. For instance, after 
Gijón was bombed in August 1936, anarchist militias went to the local prison where they 
killed a large number of supposed sympathizers of the nationalist cause, including 12 
clergymen. Similar killings by left-wing militiamen took place in Bilbao between 
October 1936 and January 1937 as revenge for victims of aerial attacks. Many priests 
were also among those supposed members of the fifth column – a term introduced by 
General Mola, who maintained that right-wing supporters of the rebelling army officers 
would help in the conquest of Madrid – killed just behind the front line, especially when 
a Nationalist advance was imminent. Thus, when in November 1936 Madrid came under 
siege and it was decided to evacuate a large number of the prisoners, communist and 
anarchist militia took matters into their own hands by executing the human cargo of many 
vans carrying prisoners out of the city, and inevitably many who died were members of 
the clergy.43 
It is also doubtful whether most of the other anticlerical killings were totally 
spontaneous. In many cases it was militias from elsewhere that took the lead in purging 
the villages so those who arrested or killed the members of the clergy were often not 
members of their community. Thus, in the Aragonese town of Barbastro, where in the 
end 88 per cent of the clergy succumbed, workers’ militias from Barcelona and other 
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parts of Catalonia – on their way to the nearby front – killed most of the local monks.44 It 
is also unclear whether the destruction of church buildings and the killing of members of 
the local clergy were spontaneous acts, inspired by examples from neighbouring places, 
or whether militias received instructions to burn down the churches and go after the 
priests. In general, the incidents were not caused by a mob suddenly going out of control 
but by a small number of hotheads that took the lead. Nonetheless, in many instances a 
large number of people participated or looked on more passively. 
The Catalan historian Albertí argues that we have to distinguish between the 
various ideological currents. Most republicans and moderate socialists opposed the 
anticlerical outbursts, while anticlericalism was not part of the core ideas of the more 
revolutionary socialists and communists either, which focused on the class struggle 
against capitalism. For them, dead priests were merely collateral damage that could be 
justified in the context of the war. This was different for the anarchists, for whom the 
elimination of the Catholic Church was an integral part of their strategy to bring about a 
true and lasting social and moral revolution. Demolishing the buildings was not enough, 
the Catholic religion itself had to be rooted out completely before a new and truly free 
society could come about. Although in many cases it is difficult to establish exactly who 
was responsible for the destructions and killings, it is clear, according to Albertí, that the 
anarchists had the upper hand and that most acts of transgressive behaviour were 
committed by them.45 
 
Conclusion 
We can now conclude that the fierce anticlericalism that developed during the first 
decade of the 20th century and came to a dramatic outburst during the Spanish Civil War 
should be understood – through its use of ritual forms and postulating its own ideals as 
absolutes – as a form of sacralization of politics. The realization of the progressive 
political dreams was possible only if the constricting ties of Catholicism were broken, 
and if that could not be done voluntarily, it had to be realized forcibly by physically 
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eliminating the Church and its representatives. The belief in disbelief also clearly 
contained a religious element. A brief, but thorough purification by ritual, iconoclastic 
violence would, in the eyes of many, bring a new dawn, a new society, and a kind of 
secular heaven on Earth.  
Spanish anticlericalism gained traits of a political religion when in the early 20th 
century the earlier enlightened and elitist variant was abandoned and a more populist 
course was chosen by Alejandro Lerroux. He consciously mixed a rational and secular 
outlook with elements of an older popular anticlerical tradition, and in order to reach a 
mass audience he adopted symbols, images and forms taken from Catholicism, with 
which his audience was still very familiar. Pilgrimages became democratic picnics, saints 
were replaced by republican martyrs, and processions with banners and psalms were 
turned into demonstrations with republican flags and revolutionary anthems. Moreover, 
he frequently used terms and concepts derived from the Christian faith, portraying 
himself in a messianic way while his adversaries were demonized and the revolution was 
promoted as eventually leading the nation to the Promised Land.  
It has also been shown that the Spanish Civil War should not be seen – not even 
partially – as an archaic religious war. While in other major Catholic countries in Europe 
the state had succeeded in restricting the influence of the Church in the public sphere 
during the second half of the 19th century this had not been the case in Spain. As a result, 
the increasing political polarization between left and right – which happened almost 
everywhere in Europe during the interwar years – became enmeshed with a maybe even 
more intense struggle between clericals and anticlericals. What was at stake was not 
merely the power over the state and the public space but the almost totalitarian 
dominance over the private sphere and over the hearts and minds of the population. 
Although it is clear that the fierce anticlerical preaching of politicians and 
intellectuals such as Lerroux had prepared the ground for the anticlerical violence of 
1936, anticlerical rhetoric had proven to be a successful strategy to mobilize the masses 
and unite all revolutionary forces. However, the outburst of anticlerical violence in 1936 
was not coordinated from above but was a spontaneous response by the public to this 
rhetoric. Apparently, there was a large demand from below for ideologies that gave an 
all-encompassing and absolute solution to all human problems and sufferings, and this 
certainly proved to be the case in Spain. As a result the rise and ‘success’ of political 
religions cannot be attributed only to irrational but charismatic politicians, such as 
Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin. 
There are, nevertheless, some limits to the applicability of a political-religion 
approach to Spanish anticlericalism. In the first place it was a quite ephemeral 
phenomenon and did not become an integrated and institutionalized part of a totalitarian 
regime. When in the spring of 1937 the government regained control over the republican 
territories public order was more or less restored. As a consequence anticlerical violence 
subsided and – except for the last days of the war when acts of vengeance became 
frequent again – rapidly lost its appeal. Furthermore, it is also possible to criticize the 
presumably spontaneous character of the anticlerical outbursts. Eradicating the Church 
from Spain seems to have been a primordial element of the anarchist revolutionary 
strategy, but although most of their anticlerical ideals were shared by at least part of the 
other left-wing militia and their sympathisers, it is not entirely clear if the violence was 
produced by a few determined fanatics or radical hotheads who profited from the passive 
attitude of a large mass of bystanders or if substantial parts of the public voluntarily 
decided to participate in the anticlerical violence.  
However, by interpreting anticlericalism as a form of sacralization of politics it 
has also become clear that Spanish developments were not very exceptional. The 
anticlerical violence should not be seen as an atavistic outburst of millenarian beliefs or 
archaic forms of protests nor as a more rational reaction to centuries of political 
oppression and economic exploitation but as a phenomenon that was quite typical of the 
difficult transition to the age of mass politics that took place all over Europe during the 
first half of the 20th century. 
 
